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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ramiro R. Navarez appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to robbery. On appeal, he challenges the denial of his 
motion to suppress and the denial of his motion for funds to retain an expert. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on October 27, 2006, two men robbed the 
Maverick store located on Scott Avenue in Rupert. (4116107 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 6-7, 
22-23.) An "all call" went out to law enforcement. (4116107 Tr., p. 26, L. 19.) The 
dispatcher advised that there were two suspects, one of whom had a weapon; 
that they were wearing hooded sweatshirts, stocking caps, and bandannas; and 
that they left the store on foot. (4116107 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 19-24.) Sheriff's Deputy 
Joe Moore heard the "all call" and began driving toward Rupert from Paul. 
(4116107 Tr., p. 29, L. 14.) 
On the drive from Paul to Rupert, Deputy Moore observed two or three 
cars traveling in the opposite direction, but the occupants did not match the 
description of the robbers supplied by dispatch. (4116107 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 8-9, 12.) 
As Deputy Moore approached the Stimpy's convenience store (4116107 
Tr., p. 30, Ls. 22-25, p.31, Ls. 1-2), he could see another car approaching from 
the opposite direction, so he slowed down in order to make use of the well-lit 
area (4/16/07 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 10-13). On approach, the other car was only 
traveling 42 mph in a 55 mph zone. (4116107 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 5-6; p. 34, Ls. 7-8.) 
Deputy Moore testified that, using the light from Stimpy's to get a better look, he 
observed that the car was occupied by four Hispanic males, all with shaved 
heads, and sitting in the "low rider" position. (4116107 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 10-13; p.35, 
Ls. 2-7; p. 37, Ls. 4-6; p. 47, Ls. 5-8.) Officer Moore further testified that he 
continued to observe the vehicle in his rear view mirror after the two cars passed. 
(4116107 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 14-24; p. 37, Ls. 14-17; p. 38, Ls. 14-19.) The occupants 
appeared to act suspiciously to Deputy Moore because they were making "furtive 
movements," and he could see that all four occupants turned to look at him. 
(4116107 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 16-17; p. 37, Ls. 14-17; p. 38, Ls. 14-22; p. 43, Ls. 20-25.) 
Moore turned around and followed the vehicle back toward Paul. (4116107 
Tr., p. 38, L. 25 - p.31, L.1.) Moore observed that the vehicle was being driven 
carefully at a speed below the limit; that the car's occupants appeared to be 
making "furtive movements" and appeared to be nervous; that the driver always 
used his turn signal when changing lanes or turning corners; and that often the 
signal was turned on well in advance of the lane change or turn, all of which 
Moore interpreted as an exaggerated effort to obey all traffic rules and avoid 
suspicion, but which only served to increase the officer's suspicion. (4116107 Tr., 
p. 31, Ls. 5-11, 21-25; p. 32, Ls. 14-20; p. 42, Ls. 9-18; p. 43, Ls. 20-25; p. 45, 
Ls. 7-11, 19-25; p. 46, Ls. 1-4.) 
Moore pulled the car over after following it to Paul because, based on his 
training and experience, the behavior of the driver and other occupants was 
suspicious. (4116107 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 2-8, 16-25.) Deputy Moore also recalled being 
told by dispatch that the suspects were Hispanic (4116107 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 2-22), 
and he believed that he observed that the occupants of the car were Hispanic 
(4116107 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 23-25). In addition, the car was traveling within a 
reasonable proximity to the time and place of the robbery. (4116107 Tr., p. 79, Ls. 
3-6.) Moore stated that when he approached the car, the driver (Navarez) 
appeared calm, but the three passengers were acting nervous. (R., p. 26, para 
15.) Moore saw that two of the occupants matched the description of the 
robbers, and that there were hooded sweatshirts, stocking caps, and bandannas 
in plain view in the car. (R., p. 26, paras 13-14.) Moore detained all four 
occupants of the vehicle and seized the vehicle as evidence. (R., p. 27, para 
23.) 
The State charged Navarez with robbery and sentencing enhancements 
for using a gun in the commission of a crime and for criminal activity associated 
with any gang or gang member (R., pp. 61-67, 72-74). Navarez moved to 
suppress evidence obtained from the tragic stop. (R., pp. 70-71 .) He also made 
a motion for funds to hire an expert to rebut Deputy Moore's anticipated 
testimony as to the visual observations he made before stopping Navarez's car. 
(R., pp. 104-05.) The district court denied both motions. (R., pp. 131-38, 141- 
42.) 
Navarez entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved the right to appeal 
the denial of his suppression motion and motion for expert funds. (R., pp. 171- 
76.) The sentencing enhancement charges were dismissed. The court accepted 
Navarez's guilty plea (R., p. 172), and imposed a unified sentence of 25 years, 
with seven years fixed, followed by 18 years indeterminate, and retained 
jurisdiction (R., pp. 188-95). 
Navarez filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. (R., pp. 198- 
ISSUES 
Navarez states the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Was it fundamentally unfair and thus a violation of Mr. Navarez's 
constitutional and statutory rights for the district court to deprive him of the 
expert services required to present an adequate defense? 
2. Was there a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupants of 
the car were the robbers of the store when they did not match the 
description other than by their ethnicity? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The State rephrases the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Has Navarez failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress? 
2. Has Navarez failed to show that he was deprived of his constitutional and 
statutory rights when the district court denied him funds for certain expert 
services? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Navarez Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Supmess 
A. Introduction 
Navarez challenges the denial of his motion to suppress arguing, as he 
did below, that Deputy Moore did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion 
to stop Navarez's vehicle. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) Application of the law to 
the facts supports the district court's order denying Navarez's motion to 
suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, a 
bifurcated standard is applied. State v. Butcher, 137 ldaho 125, 129, 44 P.3d 
1180, 1184 (Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied (2002) (citing State v. Abeyta, 131 ldaho 
704, 708, 963 P.2d 387, 391 (Ct. App. 1998)). The appellate court defers to the 
lower court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence in the record, and freely reviews the application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found. Id. The determination of whether a search is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. Butcher, 137 ldaho at 129, 44 P.3d at 
1184 (citing State v. Mclntee, 124 ldaho 803, 804, 864 P.2d 641, 642 (Ct. App. 
1993)). 
C. The District Court Correctlv Concluded, Based On The Totality Of The 
Circumstances, That The Traffic Stop Was Supported Bv Reasonable 
Articulable Suspicion 
A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless it 
falls within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. State v. Butcher, 137 ldaho 125, 129, 44 P.3d 1180, 1184 (Ct. App. 
2002) (citations omitted). A warrantless stop is justified if there is a reasonable 
and articulable suspicion that an individual either has or is going to commit a 
crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). A traffic stop is considered to be a 
seizure. State v. Gutierrez, 137 ldaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct. App. 
2002). The district court correctly concluded that the stop in this case was 
constitutionally reasonable because, by the time Deputy Moore followed it back 
to Paul, he had developed, based on all of the circumstances, a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the individuals in the car might have committed the 
armed robbery of the Maverick station. State v. Butcher, 137 ldaho 125, 129, 44 
P.3d 1180, 1184 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and 
Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)). 
In another case also involving a warrantless stop, State v. Butcher, 137 
ldaho 125, 44 P.3d 1180 (Ct. App. 2002), the defendant was convicted of first 
degree murder, and appealed the district court's pretrial ruling denying his motion 
to suppress. At 4:00 a.m., Butcher and another man had broken into the home of 
Blake Morgan and shot three rounds into his head and neck. Butcher, 137 ldaho 
at 128, 44 P.2d at 1183. The two men fled in a grey two-toned van, as observed 
by a neighbor drawn to his window by the sound of gunshots. Id. 
A few days later, a Twin Falls police officer stopped a van matching the 
description of the vehicle used in an immediately preceding armed robbery (and 
the murder). Butcher, 137 ldaho at 129-30, 44 P.3d at 1184-85. The officer saw 
firearms in plain view in the van, including a nine-millimeter pistol. a. This led to 
the detention and arrest of Butcher and his co-defendant because they were 
perceived to be dangerous and there was reasonable suspicion to believe that 
they had been involved in the robbery. 
Butcher made a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence that resulted 
from the stop, namely the weapons and especially the pistol. The court held that 
the officer was justified in conducting a stop because the officer had a 
reasonable suspicion that a serious felony had been committed by the occupants 
of the van based on information he was provided, the officer observed that the 
two persons in the van matched the description given to him, and the van was 
the only vehicle in the vicinity at 1.47 a.m. Butcher, 137 Idaho at 130, 44 P.3d at 
1185. 
Similarly here, Deputy Moore developed a reasonable articulable 
suspicion to make the stop because the dispatcher indicated that the victim of the 
robbery reported that it was committed by two Hispanic males, and Deputy 
Moore observed what he thought to be Hispanic males in the car he followed. 
He also knew that the robbery had occurred around 1:00 a.m. and that, coming 
from a small town like Rupert with only a few exits, it would be reasonable to 
expect that the robbers might be traveling out of Rupert on the road that leads to 
Paul at that time of night. (4116107 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 18-21; p.47, Ls. 16-25; p. 59, 
Ls. 16-25.) Deputy Moore also testified that included in his reasons for stopping 
the car was that the people inside the vehicle showed a "keen" interest in him as 
an officer and, further, that "there was furtive movement inside the vehicle once 
they had seen it was a police officer's vehicle. . . ." (4/16/07 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 16- 
24.) Based on the totality of these factors, the district court was correct in 
concluding that the motion to suppress should be denied because these facts 
and observations by Deputy Moore gave rise to a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion. 
In a case relied upon by the district court in this case, State v. Gascon, 
119 Idaho 932, 812 P.2d 239 (1991), the court found that, based on a brief 
description of a robber, the police were justified in setting up a roadblock and 
observing passing motorists, looking for one that matched the suspect's 
description. When Gascon's car passed through the roadblock, the police 
thought the driver was acting suspiciously and the car was stopped. Under the 
seat, the police saw a baseball cap protruding. Upon removing the hat, the 
officer found a jacket, notes, and a bag of money. Gascon was charged with 
robbery and his motion to suppress the evidence found in the car was denied. 
The appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. 
The Navarez's argument that Deputy Moore somehow did not have a 
reasonable articulabie suspicion is not supported by the record. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 12; 4116107 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 16-25.) Deputy Moore testified that his 
suspicion was aroused because the people in the car showed an interest in him 
as an officer; there was "furtive movement" in the car; and the occupants 
appeared to be Hispanic, as described in the "all call." Interestingly enough, 
Navarez also cited State v. Butcher, (citing Gascon, a), but he does 
not distinguish the circumstances that exist here from the circumstances in 
Butcher, where the court approved the traffic stop and detention. Butcher is a 
case that, factually, parallels the instant case on the issues of the stop and 
search. The outcome in Butcher, where the trial court denied the defendant's 
motion to suppress based on similar circumstances as in this case, does not 
support Navarez's arguments, especially where Navarez does not make a 
distinction between the instant case and the rulings in Butcher and Gascon, 
supra. 
The district court correctly applied the law to the facts in concluding that 
Deputy Moore, having observed four persons matching the general description of 
the suspects in the car at that late hour and in that vicinity, he was justified in 
conducting a Tern/ stop and detaining the occupants. State v. Butcher, 137 
Idaho 125,44 P.3d 1180,1185 (Ct. App. 2002). Navarez has failed to show any 
basis for reversal of the denial of his motion to suppress. 
II. 
Navarez Failed To Show That He Was Deorived Of His Constitutional Riqhts In 
The Denial Of Funds To Hire An Expert 
A. Introduction 
Navarez requested funds to hire a spatial and visual expert. Navarez 
anticipated that the expert's testimony would refute Deputy Moore's testimony 
about what Moore was able to observe in the dark on the evening of the robbery 
relative to Navarez's car and its occupants. The district court denied Navarez's 
motion, ruling that the expert's testimony would not assist the trier of fact. 
Navarez challenges the denial of his motion for funds to hire an expert 
witness at state expense arguing, as he did below, that the district court denied 
him "fundamental fairness as embodied in the Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as his right to present evidence 
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment." (Appellant's brief, p. 4.) Navarez has failed 
to show either an abuse of discretion or a violation of his constitutional rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Before authorizing the expenditure of public funds in an indigent's 
defense, the trial court must determine whether the funds are necessary in the 
interest of justice. State v. Olin, 103 ldaho 391, 396, 648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982) 
(citing State v. Powers, 96 ldaho 833, 838, 537 P.2d 1369, 1374 (1975)). This 
determination is within the discretion of the trial court, and a denial of a request 
for investigative services will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial 
court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion would occur if the court 
rendered a decision which is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the 
circumstances. State v. Olin, 103 ldaho 391, 396, 648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982). 
C. Aa~lication Of The Law To The Facts Shows That Navarez Was Not 
Deprived Of His Constitutional Rishts In The Denial Of Funds To Hire An 
Exoert 
Navarez requested funds to hire an expert pursuant to ldaho Code 
Section 19-852(a)(2), to retain the services of Marc Green, PhD. (R., pp. 104- 
16.) Dr. Green's expertise is as a spatial and visual expert and Navarez wanted 
to hire him to challenge the observations made by Deputy Moore under the 
conditions that existed the night of the traffic stop. Navarez contended that 
Deputy Moore's observations were "highly suspect" and that Dr. Green would 
testify about what in fact could have been and what was or was not observed by 
Deputy Moore. (319107 Tr., p. 6, L. 17 - p. 8, L. 11.) However, the district court 
questioned whether Dr. Green's testimony would assist the trier of fact. The 
prosecutor stated that, "I don't believe that this expert's testimony will in any way 
assist the trier of fact in determining what's relevant as to a reasonable suspicion 
in this case." (319107 Tr. p. I I, Ls. 20-23.) The district court agreed, ruling: 
The accuracy of the deputy's statements about what 
he observed at night while the vehicles were passing 
each other and then through his rearview mirror after 
the vehicles had passed can, if necessary to decide 
this case, be determined by the court without the 
assistance of an expert witness. It is the fact finder's 
function to judge the credibility of witnesses. (citations 
omitted) The court finds that the denial of the 
services of an expert witness at this stage of the 
proceedings will not deny the defendant of the 
fundamental fairness required by the due process 
clause. Therefore, an expenditure of funds for that 
purpose is not necessary in the interest of justice. 
(R., p. 137.) Contrary to Navarez's assertions on appeal, the district court acted 
well within its discretion in denying Navarez's motion. 
The Constitution does not require a state to provide expert or investigative 
assistance merely because a defendant requests it. State v. Lovelace, 140 
ldaho 53, 65, 909 P.3d 278, 290 (20b3), (citing State v. Olin, 103 ldaho 391, 648 
P.2d 203 (1982)) (additional citations omitted). A defendant's request for expert 
or investigative services should be reviewed in light of all circumstances and 
measured against the standard of "fundamental fairness" embodied in the due 
process clause. Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 65, 278 P.3d at 290 (citations omitted). 
It is clear from the record that, in ruling on Navarez's motion for funds to 
retain an expert, the district court took into account the fundamental fairness 
required by the due process clause, and the circumstances of the case. The 
Court concluded that the expert requested by Navarez would not aid the court as 
the trier of fact, but rather it was a matter of weighing Deputy Moore's testimony 
as the trier of fact. Navarez failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the 
district court's ruling and, as such, the ruling should not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Navarez's guilty plea to robbery. 
Dated this 8th day of October 2008. 
Deputy ~ t t o r i e y  General 
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